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I. Introduction
High tech markets must strike an awkward balance between coordination and
competition in order to achieve efficiency. The need for competition is familiar; an-
titrust-as well as many other legal institutions-recognizes that consumers benefit
and resources are best allocated when producers face fierce competition. But at the
same time, the interoperability of competing high tech products can promote both
consumer and producer welfare' necessitating a level of coordination not typically
The author is an Associate Professor at Vanderbilt Law, and she has published articles in journals
including Texas Law Reviw, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and Northwestern Law Re-
view.
See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308-09 (3d Cir. 2007); Elyse Dorsey &
Matthew R. McGuire, How the Google Consent Order Alters the Process and Outcomes of
FRAND Bargaining, 20 GEO. MASON L. REv. 979, 981 (2013); Deborah L. Feinstein et al., Econo-
mists' Roundtable on Hot Patent-Related Antitrust Issues, 27 ANTITRUST, Summer 2013, at 10, 11;
Joseph Kattan, FRAND Wars and Section 2, 27 ANTITRUST, Summer 2013, at 30, 30 ("Standards
play a critical role in the computing, networking, communications, and electronics industries,
among others, by enabling different manufacturers' products to exchange information with and
work alongside each other.").
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associated with atomistic, competitive markets. The necessity of interoperability
has been addressed privately by industry-wide standard-setting and coordination of
competitors around these standards.2 Likewise, the competitive risks of that coordi-
nation are also addressed through private agreements; standard-setting organizations
(SSOs) typically require that holders of patents essential to the standard agree by
contract to license their patents to users at fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) rates.3
What is a "fair and reasonable" rate? 4 This question has plagued courts and
scholars alike, but until earlier this year no court had actually determined a "fair and
reasonable" rate for standard-essential patents (SEPs). The first,5 and to date only,
determination of such a rate was performed by Judge James L. Robart in Microsoft
v. Motorola,6 a contract dispute over whether Motorola breached its FRAND com-
mitment by requesting 2.25% of the final price of Microsoft products using its
standard-essential technology. Judge Robart, in a lengthy opinion that is dense with
facts, carefully considered the technology at issue, the setting of the standard, and
the negotiations that led up to the dispute, ultimately arriving at a rate far lower than
Motorola had demanded.7
While Judge Robart should be commended for taking the bull by the horns, his
opinion is ultimately unsatisfactory because it at least partially begs the question it
tries to answer. To arrive at the "fair and reasonable" rate, he conducted a hypothet-
ical negotiation between Microsoft (the patent user in the case) and Motorola (the
patent holder). Hypothetical negotiations are often invoked by economists as the
appropriate method to determine efficient "fair and reasonable" rates,8 and so in that
sense his method stood on solid ground. However, he chose the wrong moment in
time for the hypothetical negotiation, conducting it after the FRAND obligation was
in place.9 But legal opinions like Judge Robart's are the FRAND context-the legal
2 See Dorsey & McGuire, supra note 1, at 981-82; Feinstein et al., supra note 1, at 11; Suzanne
Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 889, 891 (2011).
3 See Dorsey & McGuire, supra note 1, at 984-85; Kattan, supra note 1, at 30; Mark A. Lemley &
Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents,
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1140 (2013).
4 The related question of what is non-discriminatory is also essential to giving meaning to FRAND
commitments, but because the case on which this essay is focused discussed only the reasonable
portion of the FRAND inquiry, I will not discuss the non-discrimination requirement. For an ex-
cellent discussion of the "ND" in FRAND, see Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Eco-
nomic Interpretation ofFRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 531, 546 (2013).
5 See Kattan, supra note 1, at 31 (referring to Microsoft v. Motorola as "the only judicial decision to
date to establish a F/RAND royalty rate").
6 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12-20 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 25, 2013).
Id. at *2-4.
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1147 (discussing the use of hypothetical negotiations
in setting a reasonable royalty).
9 See Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *16 ("In this section, the court sets out the factors that an
SEP owner and standard-implementer would consider during a hypothetical negotiation over a rea-
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shadow in which FRAND negotiations occur-not the other way around.
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of Judge
Robart's "fair and reasonable" rate determination in Microsoft v. Motorola. Part II
then points out the importance of establishing a legal definition of the "FR" ("fair
and reasonable") in FRAND terms. Part II goes on to advocate using a patent's pre-
standard incremental value over alternatives as its expost "fair and reasonable" rate,
but also identifies the difficulties of measuring that value. Part III then argues that
by trying to avoid the vagaries of counterfactual reasoning that an ex ante incremen-
tal value determination requires, Judge Robart's "fair and reasonable" analysis in
Microsoft v. Motorola is less useful to potential FRAND litigants than it could have
been. Part IV suggests that in FRAND disputes, courts should consider setting "fair
and reasonable" rates by simulating a pre-standard bargain not between the parties
to the ex post FRAND dispute, but rather between the patent holder and the SSO it-
self. Using these parties for the hypothetical bargain may address some of the in-
formational uncertainties that plague counterfactual reasoning about "fair and rea-
sonable" rates while also approximating the ex ante incremental value of the
technology.
II. Judge Robart's Opinion
Microsoft sued Motorola in 2010, alleging that Motorola breached its obliga-
tion to license patents essential to two standards used in Microsoft products at
FRAND' 0 rates. Microsoft was not actually party to the contracts that gave rise to
the obligation; those contracts were between Motorola and two SSOs, the Institute
of Electrical Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU)." The contracts memorialized the terms on which the SSOs would
consider incorporating Motorola's patents in industry-wide standards. As it turned
out, the IEEE incorporated sixteen Motorola patents into a video coding standard
known as H.264,12 and the ITU incorporated twenty four of Motorola's patents into
a Wi-Fi standard known as 802.11, according to Motorola.13 Thus, according to the
terms of Motorola's contracts with the IEEE and the ITU, Motorola was obligated
to license all of its patents essential to the H.264 and 802.11 standards to all users at
"fair and reasonable" rates. Microsoft, who uses the standards in question in several
of its products including Xbox and Windows, claimed that it was the third-party
beneficiary of these contracts and so could sue Motorola to enforce a FRAND
rate-and the court agreed.14
sonable royalty rate to be paid for patents obligated to a RAND commitment.").
'o Actually, it appears that the contractual term omitted the "fair" portion, and indeed Robart refers
throughout to "RAND" rates. But "FRAND" and "RAND" have been given identical meaning in
the law and legal literature, and so I use "FRAND" throughout this paper for simplicity.
Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *1.
12 Id. at *27.
" Id. at *53.
14 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029, 1032 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
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A. Standard-Setting and Economic Guideposts for FRAND rates
Recognizing that Microsoft's breach of contract claim hinged on the factual
question of whether Motorola's proposed terms of 2.25% were FRAND, Judge
Robart embarked on a factual determination of "fair and reasonable" rates for the
patents at issue, publishing his "findings of fact and conclusions of law" in the opin-
ion." Judge Robart began the opinion by summarizing the use and purpose of
FRAND, identifying the benefits of standards while emphasizing the competitive
risks that FRAND agreements are designed to address.16 He explained that once a
standard is set, holders of standard-essential patents can hold-up users of the stand-
ard by demanding exorbitant licensing fees for their now essential technology.' 7
Hold-up is an exercise of SEP-holders' market power conferred by the standard it-
self; without the standard, the patent holders would have faced competition from
technological alternatives.' 8 He explained that in order to prevent hold-up, SSOs
typically demand that as a condition for incorporating a technology into a standard,
owners of patents in that technology must agree to license all users on FRAND
terms.1' This safeguard, Judge Robart observed, helps the SSO achieve its ultimate
goal: industry-wide adoption of the standard.20
With these goals of SSOs and FRAND commitments in mind, Judge Robart
then explored the economic meaning of fair and reasonable. After hearing from
several expert economists, Judge Robart observed some general principles that
would guide his FRAND determination. 2 1 First, he explained, a "fair and reasona-
ble" rate must avoid the hold-up problem it was designed to address. 22 Second,
"fair and reasonable" rates should "address the risk of royalty stacking by consider-
ing the aggregate royalties that would apply if other SEP holders made royalty de-
mands" on the many patents (often in the thousands) used by a high-tech product.23
Finally, Judge Robart observed that the "fair and reasonable" rate should not reward
the value of the patent as essential to an industry standard because that value is what
gives the patent holder the market power to hold-up users and what necessitates
FRAND commitments in the first place.24
is Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *1.
16 Id. at *12.
17 Id. at *10-11.
1 For an excellent discussion of hold-up, see Joseph Farrell et. al, Standard Setting, Patents, and
Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 612-15 (2007).
19 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *7.
20 Id. at *10.
21 Id. at *12.
22 id
23 Id. See Feinstein et al., supra note 1, at 14-15; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1150. Royalty
stacking is an overpricing inefficiency commonly known as a "Cournot compliments" problem. In
the context of individually negotiated licensing agreements, the holder of each patent essential to
the production of the product has the incentive to demand up to the producer's profit. Without col-
lectively bargaining with the patent holders, the producer will be unable to negotiate licenses at a
cost that will allow him to produce the product.
24 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12.
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Judge Robart then paraphrased the FRAND measures offered by each side, ul-
timately expressing a preference for Motorola's. 2 5 Judge Robart pointed out that
Microsoft's suggestion-that the "incremental value of the technology compared to
the alternatives that could have been written into the standard"-is technically cor-
rect as a matter of economic efficiency, but he rejected it as too "hard to imple-
ment." 2 6 Rather, he accepted Motorola's suggestion that FRAND terms be deter-
mined by "simulating a hypothetical bilateral negotiation" between Motorola and
Microsoft. 27 This option had more practical appeal for Judge Robart because simi-
lar negotiations actually occur in the real world.28 Further, the existence of a legal
standard for constructing hypothetical licensing deals-set forth in Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.29 and endorsed by the Federal CircuitA-
counseled in favor of Motorola's approach.31
Judge Robart emphasized, however, that the hypothetical negotiation must take
place within the FRAND context.32 One consequence of this conclusion was that
some of Georgia-Pacific's fifteen factors needed modification.3  Where the tradi-
tional test, which is used in patent infringement cases to determine damages, asks
courts to look to comparable licenses in the industry, Judge Robart decided that on-
ly licenses subject to FRAND commitments would be comparable.34 Similarly,
where Georgia-Pacific suggests looking to the customs of the industry in setting
royalty rates, Judge Robart insisted that only practices within the FRAND context
would be considered.3 5 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, for the Georgia-
Pacific factors that directed courts to consider the value of the patented technolo-
gy, 3 6 Judge Robart said he would only consider the value of the technology apart
from its value as essential to a standard.37
B. Judge Robart's Hypothetical Negotiation
Armed with a modified fifteen-prong test and some general principles about
the economic goals of FRAND, Judge Robart began the ambitious task of construct-
25 Id. at *13-16.
26 Id. at *13.
27 Id. at *14.
28 id.
29 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
30 See Laser Dynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 60 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) (stating that the
Georgia-Pacific factors have been previously approved by the federal circuit to frame the determi-
nation of a reasonable royalty).
31 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *15.
32 Id. at *16.
33 id.
14 Id. at *18.
35 Id.
36 Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (referring to the
value of the patented technology in factors 6, 8, 10, 11, and 13).
37 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12.
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ing counter-factual negotiations between Motorola and Microsoft over the SEPs.
Because the technical features of the standards and patents formed the context of
this hypothetical negotiation, Judge Robart meticulously detailed the technology
and the standard-setting process that gave rise to H.264 and 802.11, as well as the
role that each standard plays in Microsoft's Windows and Xbox.3 8 Crucially, Judge
Robart concluded that Motorola's patents were relatively minor components of the
standards, and the standards were relatively minor components of Microsoft's prod-
ucts. 39
With the relative value of Motorola's patents to Microsoft's products in mind,
Judge Robart turned to the Georgia-Pacific factors. Several of the factors direct
courts to consider comparable license deals-within the industry and preferably
with the products and parties in question-in determining a reasonable royalty.40
To aid in this inquiry, each side presented deals that it believed most closely ap-
proximated hypothetical Microsoft-Motorola transactions over patents essential to
the standards. 4 1 Motorola justified its demand of 2.25% by showing that it had re-
ceived that royalty from three other users of the standards, 42 but the court rejected
these because in each case only a portion of the 2.25% royalty could be attributed to
the use of the H.264 and 802.11 SEPs. 43
Microsoft's suggested comparable transactions, and the ones the court ulti-
mately used, were licensing fees charged in patent pools to which many holders of
patents essential to the H.264 and 802.11 standards belonged.4 4 Patent pools are as-
sociations of SEP owners and users that allow all members to share the use of the
patents in the pool.4 5 Users are charged set fees to use all the patents in the pool,
avoiding the transaction costs associated with individual negotiations, while patent
holders are paid royalties on a per patent basis, avoiding the transaction costs of in-
dividual determinations of patent value.4 6 Patent pools are voluntary-patent own-
ers can opt out of pools in favor of individual negotiations with users-and FRAND
commitments neither preclude nor require participation in pools. 4 7 Judge Robart
explained that patent pools provided an excellent baseline for a FRAND rate deter-
mination because FRAND commitments and patent pools share a primary goal: to
" Id. at *21-27, *42-64.
3 Id. at *47-48, *57-58, *60, *62, *64.
40 Id. at *17.
41 Id. at *65-72, *74, *93-96.
42 Id at *65.
43 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *68, *70-72.
4 Id. at *82.
45 Id. at *74-75. See also Roger B. Andewelt, Analysis ofPatent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 611 (1985) ("All pools ... have one common characteristic: two or more pa-
tent owners mutually agreeing to waive exclusive rights under their respective patents so as to
grant each other rights ... under their patents.").
46 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74-75. See also Andewelt, supra note 45, at 611-12 (discuss-
ing pool license fees).
47 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *74.
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promote and facilitate the widespread use of the patented technology. 48 Further, pa-
tent pools often contain thousands of patents used in a single product, so the rates
are unlikely to contribute to the royalty stacking problem that may result from indi-
vidualized licensing.4 9
Both the H.264 standard and the 802.11 standard have a relevant patent pool,
but not all patents essential to each standard are available in the respective pools.
Although Motorola initially expressed interest in joining the pools, it ultimately did
not do so, electing to individually negotiate licenses with users of the H.264 and
802.11 standards. 0 Judge Robart accepted Microsoft's expert's argument that the
FRAND rate should be based on what Motorola would have earned in the pool."
This rate, according to the expert, was $0.185/unit for the H.264 patents 52 and
$0.02/unit for the 802.11 patents.
The court did not end its analysis there, however. The fact that Motorola
elected not to join the patent pools suggested that it believed it could get more by
individually negotiating licenses for its SEPs outside the pool than it would gain in
membership benefits. That FRAND commitments do not require pool participation
suggests that royalties individually negotiated outside of the pools (and by implica-
tion higher than those earned in the pools) can still be FRAND. 54 Judge Robart
concluded that these individual bargains are precisely those bilateral, private negoti-
ations that his FRAND analysis sought to recreate.55  The court reasoned that
Motorola must have expected to get at least as much from individually negotiating
with Microsoft as what Motorola was willing to give up in pool benefits. In other
words, if Motorola thought it could do better in a bilateral FRAND negotiation, then
its expected royalty rate from that deal must have been at least equal to all the bene-
fits of pool membership. The expert's figure represented only the royalty fees
Motorola would obtain in the pool, but the court observed that by joining, Motorola
also would have obtained access to all other members' patents.57 The true measure
48 Id. at *89.
49 See Feinstein et al., supra note 1, at 15 (stating that patent holders do not usually coordinate with
each other, causing the royalty stacking problem). See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1991, 2014 (2007) (discussing the tendency
for holders of weak patents to overcharge).
'0 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *75-78 (discussing Motorola's history with the H.264 pool), *88
(discussing Motorola's history with the 802.11 pool).
51 Id. at *84. Microsoft's expert estimated the royalties Motorola would have received not only if it
had joined the pool, but also if other holders of patents essential to the standards also joined. The
expert claimed that this helped avoid the royalty stacking problem. The expert calculated the rates
if all of the patent holders joined the H.264 pool, and more (but not all) joined the 802.11 pool. It
is not clear how many is "more" nor why the expert chose different hypotheticals for each pool.
52 id.
51 Id. at *91.
54 Id. at *80.
ss Id at *82.
56 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *84-85.
1 Id. at *84.
2014] 241
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL
of what Motorola hoped to gain from a negotiated FRAND rate was the sum of its
potential pool royalties and the value of access to the pool's intellectual property.
Unfortunately, Judge Robart did not have any evidence of how valuable the pa-
tents in the pools were to Motorola, but he did have that information for Microsoft,
at least for the H.264 patent pool.59 Microsoft, both an owner and a user of SEPs,
paid twice as much into the H.264 pool than it received in royalties.o Judge Robart
reasoned that as a similarly large, technologically-inclined firm, Motorola would
enjoy the same benefits.6 ' Thus, the court tripled the expert's estimate of $0.185/
unit to account for the royalty rate and the additional benefits Motorola would have
received if it had joined the H.264 pool, arriving at a FRAND rate of $0.0555.62
The court repeated a similar analysis for Motorola's hypothetical membership in the
802.11 pool, resulting in a $0.06114/unit rate. 3 These figures were several orders
of magnitude lower than the 2.25% rate demanded by Motorola.
III. Economic Definitions of FRAND and Practical Challenges
Although he could have gone further, Judge Robart's opinion sheds some
much-needed light on what "fair and reasonable" means in the FRAND context.
And the basic premises of his opinion-that technically speaking, an economically
efficient "fair and reasonable" rate will reflect the ex ante "incremental contribution
of the patented technology to the standard,"" and that such optimal "fair and rea-
sonable" rates can be estimated by simulating a hypothetical negotiation between
the patent holder and the patent user-are certainly correct. 5 As discussed in the
next section, the flaw of Judge Robart's opinion stems from his rejection of the "ex
ante incremental value" standard as impractical, and his improper situating of the
hypothetical negotiation at a time when FRAND agreements were already in place.
Here, I make the case that judicial determinations of "fair and reasonable," like that
attempted by Judge Robart, are crucial to the proper function of FRAND contracts.
This section then goes on to make the economic case for the ex ante incremental






62 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *85.
63 As it turned out, this figure was merely one data point in Judge Robart's FRAND calculation for
802.11, for two reasons. First, he believed that the 802.11 patent pool was a less strong indicator
of FRAND rates than the H.264 pool. Id. at *91. Second, unlike in the H.264 determination,
Judge Robart had access to other reliable comparable transactions that provided additional infor-
mation about FRAND rates for 802.11. The number he eventually settled on for a FRAND rate for
Motorola's 802.11 patents was $0.03471. Id. at *99.
6 Id. at *13. See also Feinstein et al., supra note 1, at 13; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1138;
Michel, supra note 2, at 893.
65 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1147-48.
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A. The Necessity of Defining "Fair and Reasonable" Rates
Although scholars tend to agree that an economically viable definition of "fair
and reasonable" is essential to preventing hold-up and ensuring the success of
standards, recent academic work has focused on the "non-discriminatory" part of
the inquiry and on reforming the procedure of FRAND rate estimation. The benefit
of shifting the focus away from "fair and reasonable" is avoiding the uncertainties
of hypothetical negotiations that proved so vexing in Microsoft. But even a rigor-
ous and workable definition of "non-discriminatory" can only supplement, not re-
place, the "fair and reasonable" inquiry. And procedural reforms will operate well
only when there is some coherent substance to the meaning of FRAND.
In the lead piece of this symposium, Dennis Carlton and Allan Shampine ad-
vocate adding economic rigor to the "non-discriminatory" prong of FRAND.6 6 The
authors define discrimination as charging similarly situated users different rates,
where "similarly situated" firms are those that derive the same benefit from the pa-
tented technology.67 This solution is entirely sensible, but cannot, by itself, affix
meaning to a FRAND term; equal treatment is still economically inefficient if the
patent holder charges exorbitant, albeit equally exorbitant, licensing fees from simi-
larly situated users. It is for this very reason, presumably, that SSOs impose
"FRAND" terms, not "ND" terms. Thus only if patent holders license to some enti-
ties who, because of the elasticity of their demand, are unwilling to pay more than
"fair and reasonable" rates, will this focus on "non-discriminatory" work to approx-
imate a FRAND rate. It is possible that this situation arises not infrequently, but the
benefits of relying on the "non-discriminatory" prong at the expense of the "fair and
reasonable" prong, even in these circumstances, should not be overstated. Carlton
and Shampine define "similarly situated" firms as ones who derive the same value
from the patent; this inquiry into "value" of a patent is essentially the same factual-
ly-fraught inquiry demanded by the "fair and reasonable" standard and would re-
quire similar counter-factual reasoning for its resolution. This suggests that Carlton
and Shampine's proposal works best when paired with a workable definition of
"fair and reasonable."
Procedural reforms of the FRAND determination likewise work best when
paired with an objective and efficient legal definition of "fair and reasonable."
Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro advocate reforming FRAND litigation procedure to
spare courts the difficulty and embarrassment of unmoored Georgia-Pacific rate de-
terminations.6 8 They propose baseball-style (or "final-offer") arbitration to settle
disputes over whether a rate is FRAND. 6 9 Baseball-style arbitration-in which each
66 Carlton & Shampine, supra note 4.
67 According to Carlton and Shampine, if firms compete directly with each other, that is evidence that
they are similarly situated and ought to be charged the same price for that price to qualify as
FRAND. See id.
68 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3.
69 Id. at 3.
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party submits a final offer between which the decision-maker must choose without
splitting the difference-creates incentives that push each party towards a reasona-
ble offer, in theory converging on a "correct" number.7 0 But this proposal cannot
entirely avoid the problem of defining FRAND because the arbitrator needs criteria
for selecting between the two final offers.7 ' Although baseball-style arbitration can
force information, without a stable legal definition of FRAND, neither party has any
meaningful information about the reasonable rate to reveal in their offers. In other
words, there is no externally reasonable rate on which the parties' offers will con-
verge.
Both of these pieces propose sensible reforms that can help to streamline reso-
lution of FRAND disputes towards economically sensible outcomes. But neither
will function very well without some objective rules about what "fair and reasona-
ble" means as a matter of law.72 Thus judicial endeavors like Judge Robart's "fair
and reasonable" determination in Microsoft v. Motorola are necessary to cast the
shadow in which arbitration or non-discriminatory dealing will occur. Recognizing
the importance of such a definition, Judge Robart squarely addressed it and provid-
ed an actual numerical estimate, rather than avoiding the question as other courts
have done. But unfortunately, as I discuss in the next section, Judge Robart's opin-
ion in Microsoft could have gone farther to clarify the legal meaning of "fair and
reasonable."
B. Economically Efficient FRAND Rates: Incremental Value Over
Alternatives
If FRAND agreements are designed to avoid the problem of patent hold-up,
and patent hold-up is defined as patent holders abusing market power conferred by
being chosen as essential to a standard, then a FRAND rate should be no greater
than what the patent holder could charge without the additional market power con-
ferred by its status as essential to a standard. Standard setting, by its nature, elimi-
nates competition by preventing free substitution among technological alternatives;
if "fair and reasonable" rates are to be interpreted to counteract price increases that
would naturally follow such a restriction on competition, then they must reflect the
competitive environment that pre-dated the setting of the standard. In such an envi-
ronment, any premium a patent holder would be able to command would reflect the
marginal benefit of its product over the next-best alternative. Thus, economists
have suggested that "fair and reasonable" rates can be estimated by creating hypo-
thetical bargains between the parties that take place before the standard has been
70 Id.
71 Indeed, Lemley and Shaprio recognize this, and they suggest what this Essay advocates as a way to
measure FRAND rates: a hypothetical, pre-standard negotiation aimed at measuring the incremen-
tal value added by the patented technology over the next best alternative. See Lemley & Shapiro,
supra note 3, at 10-11.
72 As Gregory Leonard observed in a recent interview with ANTITRUST, "Everything else will flow
from a specific definition of FRAND." Feinstein, et al., supra note 1, at 16.
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created. Crucial to this determination is the cost and desirability of alternative
technology because a patent user is only willing to pay for what it cannot obtain
more cheaply elsewhere.
Legal scholars have suggested that courts use patent infringement law as a
template for reconstructing this hypothetical negotiation, 74 as Judge Robart did in
Microsoft v. Motorola. In a patent infringement case, the plaintiff is entitled to, at a
minimum, a reasonable royalty as a measure of its damages. Courts, following
Georgia-Pacific, measure a fair licensing fee by creating a hypothetical negotiation
(assuming a willing licensor and licensee) before infringement has occurred.76 Alt-
hough none of the wide-ranging factors in the Georgia-Pacific test are explicitly
economic in nature, most modern courts interpret them as guidelines for the ines-
capably economic endeavor of setting an efficient licensing fee.
For the Georgia-Pacific test to make economic sense, this negotiation should
occur with alternatives to the patented technology in mind, and there is at least one
prominent example of the test being interpreted in that manner. Sitting by designa-
tion as a trial court judge in a patent dispute between Apple and Motorola, Judge
Richard Posner held that cheaper alternatives to licensing the infringed technology
act as a cap on damages claimed in a patent case.78 Although he ostensibly rejected
the Georgia-Pacific test as unhelpful,79 he did follow its suggestion that damages
equal to a reasonable royalty can be estimated by simulating a pre-infringement hy-
pothetical negotiation between the parties.80 Speaking as the user in such a negotia-
tion, Judge Posner said, "If we can avoid infringement at $1 a phone, we will not
pay a royalty in excess of $1 [per phone]."' Judge Posner's logic is compelling:
because patent damages are compensatory, they cannot exceed what Apple would
have paid in a but-for world where it chose not to infringe Motorola's patents.
Judge Posner's logic is easily imported to the FRAND context. If before a
standard is established, patent holder A's technology is equivalent to B's, then A
and B will compete for user C's business and A and B will ultimately charge C the
same rate. If A's is better than B's, then A will be able to charge a premium. If A
tries to charge more than the incremental value of its technology-that is, if A
charges so much that C's next-best alternative (B's technology) becomes more at-
73 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1147.
74 E.g., id at 1147-48.
7 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (providing in relevant part that "[u]pon finding for the claimant the court
shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention").
76 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 2018-19.
77Id. at 2017-19.
78 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540, 2012 WL 1959560, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 22,
2012).
7 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (stating that the Geor-
gia-Pacific test is unclear and need not be contemplated to resolve the case).
80 Id. at 913.
81 Apple, 2012 WL 1959560, at *7.
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tractive-then A will lose the business. Therefore, the premium that A can charge
C in a competitive, pre-standard market is constrained by the next-best alternative.
Any premium over the cost of that alternative will reflect the incremental value of
82the technology that economists agree should be the "fair and reasonable" rate.
C. Practical Difficulties with Measuring Ex Ante Incremental Value
Such a measure of "fair and reasonable" rates would be ideal. However, a
court attempting to simulate such a bargain faces serious practical challenges. The
trouble with this counterfactual, as with all counterfactuals, is that it requires the
clarity of a crystal ball in reverse. To perform the task properly, a judge has to trav-
el back in time and imagine the competitive mindset of the parties and their ambi-
tions for using the patents. The judge has to estimate the relative bargaining power
and skills of the parties and understand the value of trade-offs in high tech patent
deals. Perhaps most problematically, the judge has to know the technological alter-
natives that informed each side's bottom line. Even if all this information is some-
how available to the judge, he has to guess how each player would have responded
to these incentives given the complex game of high tech competition.
Of all these informational challenges, perhaps the most problematic is knowing
the patent user's next-best alternatives. Expert witnesses can help here, but the ex-
pert must be well-matched to the question to be answered. In many patent cases, as
in Judge Posner's Apple-Motorola dispute, engineers and designers testify about al-
ternative designs that achieve the functionality of patented products or about the vi-
ability of designing around the patented technology. As Judge Posner observes,
that testimony is useful, but only goes so far.84 The relevant question in patent
damages cases, as well as FRAND disputes, is the cost of the next-best alternative
(where best means offering the most benefits for the price). Sometimes the next-
best alternative may be to market the product without the infringing feature at all.
Engineers, hired to solve design problems and not to conduct cost-benefit analysis
of design alternatives or to analyze the marketability of products without certain
features, cannot address the next-best aspect of the next-best alternative inquiry.
The information problem is made worse by the fact that technology markets
are difficult to understand, let alone predict. The rapid pace of technological change
and the ubiquity of network effects make for volatile markets with idiosyncratic
winners and losers. Further, high tech products are complex and technical and un-
derstanding the role each component plays in their function is essential to estimat-
ing the value of patented technology. This presents a daunting task for lay judges.
82 Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
8 E.g. id. at 905-06.
84 id.
85 See id. (stating that courts should consider the testimony of procurement specialists and project
managers because they are in a better position to estimate the costs of alternative solutions). While
these kinds of jobs exist in traditional industries, it may be that high tech companies prefer to make
procurement and design decisions at the executive level.
246 [Vol. 22:235
Casting a FRAND Shadow
Again, experts can help here, but their participation is not a panacea. Often the only
qualified expert on a design issue unique to a particular product is an employee of
one of the parties to the suit. Thus his testimony may be self-serving and therefore
of little value to the court.86
IV. The Hypothetical Negotiation Should Take Place Before the FRAND
Commitment
Judge Robart's aversion to the vagaries of counterfactual reasoning was per-
fectly understandable, but his manner of avoiding it stripped his "hypothetical nego-
tiation" of some of its analytical leverage. The flaw in his method was that he did
not go back far enough in time to conduct the hypothetical bargain. Rather than sit-
uating it in a moment before the standard was set, he placed the bargain in the post-
standard world where FRAND commitments were already in place. In so doing, his
holding lacked analytical purchase: "fair and reasonable" rates are whatever rates
are reasonable in the FRAND context.
On the one hand, Judge Robart offered a very convincing reason for setting the
hypothetical negotiation in the FRAND context. While acknowledging that a "fair
and reasonable" rate should reflect the "incremental value of the technology com-
pared to the alternatives that could have been written into the standard," 87 Judge
Robart rejected this method of measuring FRAND in part because of its "impracti-
cability with respect to implementation by courts."88
He noted that the ex ante valuation would require knowing, or at least guess-
ing, how the use of an alternative technology would effect other design choices.
This is certainly a difficult judicial exercise, and it is compounded by the fact that a
judge would then have to estimate the value of the hypothetical product's usefulness
and popularity with consumers. Indeed, Judge Robart was right to worry about the
method's "lack of real-world applicability."89
But in changing the question to avoid the difficulty of counter-factual reason-
ing, he ended up asking a much less useful question. At best, a hypothetical negoti-
ation between parties after FRAND could reveal the parties' best estimate of the
court's ultimate FRAND finding. But when a court conducts a hypothetical negoti-
ation to illuminate the meaning of a contract term, the exercise is meant to estimate
the private, wealth-maximizing meaning of a term to the parties. Thus, hypothetical
negotiations can be helpful when a court must determine the contractual effect of an
event that the parties evidently did not consider in creating the contract. For exam-
ple, if a flood ruins the contents of a warehouse, and makes a contract-which was
86 See Apple, 2012 WL 1959560, at *9 (explaining that in a negotiation, Motorola would not go to
Apple's technical expert to get information about inventing around Apple's patent, so that expert's
testimony is of little help).
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silent on the possibility of flooding-impossible, a judge may consider how the par-
ties would have allocated the risk of a flood if-and here is where the counterfactual
comes in-they had considered the issue in the first place.
The Georgia-Pacific test, though problematic in other ways,90 provides a good
example of an appropriate use of counterfactual reasoning outside of the contract
interpretation context. Georgia-Pacific asks judges to estimate what the parties
would have settled on as a reasonable royalty if the defendant had not stolen from
the plaintiff. It is a way of determining the value of what the defendant stole for the
purpose of making the plaintiff whole. Thus the hypothetical reasoning in Georgia-
Pacific is an exercise designed to put the world right again after a legal wrong has
been committed.91
So, too, is counterfactual reasoning appropriate in interpreting a contract term
such as "fair and reasonable," but like the Georgia-Pacific test it should attempt to
imagine a negotiation that the law recognizes as in some way preferable to what
happened in the real world. In the FRAND context, that hypothetical negotiation
should take place before the standard is set, when patent holders lacked market
power, because at that time users could have substituted other technologies that ul-
timately competed for adoption into the standard. This bargain is necessarily hypo-
thetical, since courts should impute knowledge about product demand and produc-
tion costs to the parties that did not exist before the standard was set.92 Thus legal
determinations of "fair and reasonable" rates should answer the following question:
"if they knew then what they know now about demand and production, and given
all the competition that pre-dated the standard, what royalty would the plaintiff have
paid the defendant?"
The problem with choosing a post-FRAND moment for the negotiation is that
this negotiation was not hypothetical at all. Motorola and Microsoft did attempt to
negotiate after the standard was set and in the context of Motorola's FRAND com-
mitments to the SSOs, and the very existence of the lawsuit proves that those nego-
tiations failed.93 By simulating a post-FRAND Motorola-Microsoft deal, Judge
Robart effectively decided how this negotiation should have gone. That is a useful
determination, especially if negotiation has broken down as it evidently had in this
case, but it has less analytic leverage than a device-like a hypothetical negotiation
90 See Apple, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 911; Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in
Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671,
681-82 (2007).
9' Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 2019.
92 Recall that without uncertainty about demand and costs, FRAND agreements never would have
been necessary in the first place. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at n.7 ("Actual ex ante ne-
gotiations are often difficult or infeasible, in part because not all of the parties with an interest in
deploying the standard belong to the SSO.").
93 Indeed, Judge Robart explained that hypothetical bilateral negotiations are a good way to estimate
FRAND rates precisely because they occur in practice and so "there exists evidence of the results
of such real-world negotiations that can be used in simulating the hypothetical negotiation." Id. at
* 14.
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before the FRAND commitment-that could estimate the private wealth-enhancing
meaning of a term before the dispute arose. Thus, Judge Robart's confidence rang
hollow when he said that "in the context of a dispute over the proper [F]RAND roy-
alty rate, judicial simulation of a hypothetical, bilateral negotiation under the
[F]RAND obligation logically will lead to a royalty rate that both parties would
have found to be reasonable." 94 Once the FRAND commitment was in place, there
was no royalty that both parties considered "reasonable," hence the lawsuit.
That the parties themselves could not negotiate a rate that they both found rea-
sonable-either before or during the suit-illustrates the necessity of providing le-
gal clarity about what FRAND means.95 All negotiations over contractual terms oc-
cur in the shadow of legal intervention. Without a workable and predictable
definition of FRAND, these negotiations are bound to fail. Therefore, Judge
Robart's opinion should have provided the FRAND context in which such negotia-
tions occur; it should not itself rely on the pre-existence of such a context for its
reasoning.
The temporal placement of Judge Robart's hypothetical negotiation undercuts
some of the persuasive power of his muscular, mathematical Georgia-Pacific analy-
sis. When Judge Robart modified the Georgia-Pacific factor pertaining to estab-
lished royalties to look only to established royalties or customary selling prices for
patents already subject to FRAND commitments, 96 he removed much of the factor's
analytic leverage. Looking to the way in which other parties have struggled under
uncertainty about what FRAND means after the fact does not directly address the
question of what price, ex ante, would not reflect hold-up.
Judge Robart's reliance on patent pools was imperfect for a similar reason. A
firm's decision to license its patents through pools is, as he observed, made by
comparing the advantages of pool membership with what the patent holder believes
it can negotiate individually. By setting the FRAND rate for Motorola's technology
as equal to what it gave up by not entering the pool, Judge Robart implied that
Motorola must have been indifferent as between entering, the pool and licensing on
an individual basis. There is little evidence, other than the fact that Motorola flirted
with the idea of entering the H.264 pool, that Motorola believed the pool value was
close to what it could obtain through individual negotiations. It could have ex-
pected much more from negotiating with Microsoft.97 In fact, this decision to indi-
vidually negotiate occurred in the shadow of FRAND determinations, since the up-
per bound of what Motorola hoped to individually negotiate is whatever it believed
a court would ultimately find fair and reasonable. Again, Judge Robart's reasoning
94 Id. at *16.
9 See Feinstein et al., supra note 1, at 16 (arguing that having more guidance on appropriate FRAND
rates would aid standard setting and rate setting).
96 Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *18-20.
9 Judge Robart himself observed that individually-negotiated rates, even in the FRAND context,
tend to be higher than patent pool fees. Id. at *80.
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suffered from circularity because he used Motorola's prediction of what a court
would set as a FRAND rate as a proxy for the court's "fair and reasonable" rate.
No doubt Judge Robart understood that his hypothetical negotiation was sec-
ond-best to a pre-FRAND bargain, but he evidently believed that its benefits to ju-
dicial administrability outweighed its costs in analytic leverage. As I have argued,
the costs to his analysis were great, but there may be another reason why his trade-
off was not optimal. The benefits-analytic ease of a post-FRAND hypothetical
negotiation-ought not to be exaggerated. To estimate the contours of a post-
FRAND negotiation, Judge Robart needed to speculate about values arguably as
difficult to estimate as the pre-FRAND incremental value. A good example is his
speculation about the value of patent pool membership to Motorola, as is his as-
sessment that the infringing technology was a small part of Microsoft's ultimate
products.98 But the interpretive difficulty of a post-FRAND hypothetical negotia-
tion is perhaps best illustrated by the opinion's footnote 2399, in which he explains
the precise mathematical calculation that results in his "fair and reasonable" deter-
mination. The note exceeds 1,500 words, contains ten equations, and is extremely
complex.100 It would seem that the "judicial administrability" of Judge Robart's
method, purchased at such a dear cost to analytic precision, should not be overstat-
ed.
V. SSO v. SEP-Holder: A Better Hypothetical Negotiation?
To Judge Robart, the definition of "fair and reasonable" rates advocated in this
paper-the ex ante incremental value of the patent over available alternatives-was
good in theory but impossible in practice.'Oc While it seems clear that estimating
such a value is extremely difficult, even if aided by heuristics like simulations of
pre-standard negotiations between patent holder and patent user, that alone probably
does not justify abandoning the effort. And perhaps the hypothetical bargain can be
modified to allow for better informational inputs.
As discussed above, the hypothetical bargain that most closely approximates
the incremental value of the patent (other than its value as essential to the standard)
would be a pre-standard bargain between the patent holder and the patent user. This
bargain, while exceedingly difficult to simulate because of informational uncertain-
ties, does closely resemble a bargain that did occur: between the SSO and the patent
owners promoting their technology for incorporation into the standard. The bargain
is similar because it occurs before the standard is set and because the incentives of
the parties are similar. The patent holder in both bargains wants adoption of its
technology and is willing to compete on price for the business. On the other side,
the SSO's interests are aligned with those of the patent user: both want the best
98 See generally, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C 10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12-
20 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
9 Id.
100 Id .
'01 Id. at *13.
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technology with the lowest cost. The patent user wants this in order to maximize its
own profit, and the SSO wants this because high performance and low cost further
the SSO's goal of widespread adoption of the standard. Both SSOs and patent users
presumably consider alternative technologies when attempting to solve a design
problem.
Recall that FRAND commitments would be unnecessary if the SSOs and pa-
tent holders could agree, ex ante, to licensing fees for the patents essential to a
standard. Recall also that agreement at that time is impossible because too much is
unknown about the future market for the standard and products that rely on it. The
counterfactual negotiation, then, would ask "what would the SSO and patent owners
have agreed upon as a FRAND rate knowing then what they know now about this
market?" This value, which would be (appropriately) influenced by the alternatives
available at the time of standard setting, would approximate the incremental value
added by the patented technology in question, or precisely the economically effi-
cient definition of FRAND.
Simulating a negotiation between the SSO and the patent holder may help alle-
viate some of the informational troubles that led Judge Robart to abandon his ex
ante inquiry. To the extent that the hardest part of constructing a hypothetical nego-
tiation between user and holder is knowing the next-best alternative, reimagining
the negotiation as between the SSO and the patent holder partially solves this prob-
lem if the SSO keeps records of the alternatives it considers. Perhaps SSOs could
be encouraged to keep these records and their best estimates of the costs of alterna-
tives, even if the cost-benefit analysis is less formal than one may hope. Members
of the SSO could be called as witnesses in a FRAND dispute and testify about their
decision-making process. The possibility of later discovery requests may also en-
courage better record keeping at SSOs and may even result in fairer decision-
making procedures, if transparency leads SSOs to place more emphasis on the con-
sumers' bottom line than on corporate patronage.
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VI. Conclusion
Although it seems that FRAND commitments have been relatively successful
at preventing patent hold-up resulting from standard setting, their efficacy as a pri-
vate solution to a public problem is limited by the law's inability or unwillingness
to affix a meaning to its terms. Judge Robart, in his recent Microsoft v. Motorola
opinion took on the challenge of reducing a FRAND commitment to a concrete
number, but unfortunately, the opinion is less useful as a guidepost to parties and
future courts than one might have hoped. Going forward, courts should measure
"fair and reasonable" rates by the metric Judge Robart rejected: the incremental val-
ue of the patent given the next-best alternative available before the standard was set.
To perform this calculation, some counterfactual reasoning is unavoidable, but per-
haps it need not be as unmoored as Judge Robart feared. By simulating a hypothet-
ical negotiation between the SSO and the patent holder, rather than between a patent
user and a patent holder, courts may be able to supply parties with a sufficiently
definite shadow in which to conduct their FRAND rate negotiations.
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